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Copy 6 of 12

6 March 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : TACKLE, [] Briefing for State Department Officials, 3 March 1961

1. Colonel Bearli, Mr. Reber, and the undersigned, representing DFD, participated on 3 March in the briefing of Secretary of State Rusk, Under Secretary of State Bowles, Assistant Secretary of State Parsons, and the new Director of Intelligence and Research, Mr. Hillman, on TACKLE and []. The briefing was held in the Secretary's conference room. In addition to the DFD group, General Cabell was present for the agency.

2. Colonel Bearli first briefed on the background and organization of the TACKLE Project, with emphasis upon [] sponsorship but [] control locally. Mr. Reber followed with a presentation of the [] requirements picture [] with special emphasis upon the desirability of having TACKLE take as (1) a base from which we evaluate SAMOS or other satellite reconnaissance, and (2) the need for obtaining hard intelligence on the [] [], as well as photographic evidence of Soviet participation in nuclear energy or air defense areas in China proper.

3. Both Colonel Bearli and Mr. Reber then jointly presented the facts about [] once again emphasizing United States control and [] General Cabell, as well as Mr. Reber, stressed the value of the low level [] mission profile as it relates to current SAC studies for S&P purposes where SAC doctrine appears to be moving toward a low altitude penetration system since the introduction of the SAM sites in Russia. The consolidation mission return for [] over the past years was discussed, and General Cabell indicated that if approval to resume were received, a good planning figure would be on the order of two missions per month.

4. At this point Secretary Rusk was obliged to leave to meet a visitor, and as he departed, he asked Under Secretary Bowles to relate to him the answer to the general question of how urgent it was that these programs be

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activated, and what order of delays would be accepted prior to a decision. Secretary Bowles then asked if we felt that a six months' delay in either or both missions was acceptable. He related this question to the fact that the President was feeling his way on the international scene, and time was needed to evaluate the new Sino-Soviet posture with relation to the United States. General Cabell spoke to this question, as he put it, "as an intelligence officer", further stating that any delay in obtaining hard intelligence of the nature which could be derived from these programs was undesirable, but that he felt resumption of the [] Program was a move to be recommended as soon as possible, recognizing its lower political sensitivity than the TACKLE effort.



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6. Secretary Bowles then inquired if in our opinion a delay of three to four months would be tolerable for either program. General Cabell avoided answering this question directly, though he did indicate that there was not in his opinion the urgency connected with TACKLE that he felt to [] Mr. Eilsman then inquired if the TACKLE briefing had been given to McGeorge Bundy in the White House. There seemed to be no definitive answer on this, although Colonel Beerli suggested that Mr. Bissell himself may have given Mr. Bundy an oral outline. The sense of the meeting seemed to be that at some point it would be useful for Bundy to have such a briefing. In conclusion, General Cabell indicated that he would like to proceed with bringing [] to Mr. Bundy's attention, but that he would not do so until there had been an indication from the Secretary of State regarding his willingness to sponsor such a move. No firm recommendation of this nature was made for the TACKLE Project by General Cabell at this meeting, the feeling apparently being that of the two [] stood a better chance of approval at this time due to its lesser political sensitivity. It should be noted that at several points in the meeting, the question of Chinese Communist reaction to []

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Air Force, or IDEALIST overflights was brought up by Mr. Bowles. Secretary Parsons gave the definitive answer to the effect that none of these activities had ever resulted in protest by the Chinese.

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SIGNED

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